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The aim of the paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on Malaysian firms’ performance. The sample size is 424 companies on Bursa 
Malaysia. The findings reveal that in terms of board governance mechanisms, family-
controlled companies are shown to have smaller board size and practise duality 
leadership in running their businesses. In contrast, for non-family controlled 
companies, director’s qualification helps to enhance firm performance. Based on the 
findings, regulators and investors need to be aware that the corporate governance 
practised by family-controlled companies differs to that of non-family controlled 
companies.  
 





Family companies support the wealth generation in most countries around the world. 
In Asia, the literature shows that family firms reflect a high performance in Taiwan, 
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and China (Filatotchev, Lien & Piesse 2005; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). Names like the Ayala family (Phillipines), 
Li Ka-Shing (Hong Kong) and Kyuk Ho Shin (South Korea) are well-known among 
family group companies.  
 
In Malaysia, family companies contribute to more than half of the Malaysian Gross 
Domestic Product (Ngui 2002). It is estimated that 80% of 890 companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia are family-owned businesses, with the exception of quasi-
government owned firms, state development corporations, banks and multinationals 
(Soo 2003). The majority of Malaysian family firms evolved from traditional family 
owned enterprises. These firms do not embrace openness in firms‟ practices and 
continue to be managed as if they are still owned by their founders (Ow-Yong & 
Cheah 2000).  Some prominent Malaysian family businessmen are Robert Kuok 
(Kuok Brothers), Quek Leng Chan (Public Bank Group), Tunku Abdullah Tuanku 
Abdul Rahman (Melewar Group) and Tan Sri Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir (Sapura 
Holdings Bhd).  
 
Studies relating to family and non-family firms‟ performance were found to have 
mixed results. Empirical studies in the US concluded that family firms outperform 
non-family firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Miller & Breton-Miller 2006; Villalonga & 
Amit 2006). However, there are few studies on family companies‟ performance in 
Malaysia. Local studies by Samad, Amir and Ibrahim (2008) evidence that family 
ownership experiences a higher value than non-family ownership when using ROE, 
but not with Tobin‟s Q and ROA. Samad et al. (2008) only consider three variables 
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(board size, independent directors and duality performance) in their study. Amran 
and Ahmad (2009) conducted a similar study using a 2000 to 2003 dataset. They 
evidence that family-businesses and non-family businesses have different corporate 
governance practices. Family businesses with separate leadership structure perform 
better, whilst larger board size enhances non-family companies‟ performance.  
 
The inconclusive findings and the fact that a significant number of Malaysian 
companies are family owned has motivated the researcher to further explore the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms and performance on Malaysian family-
controlled companies. This study includes two new variables (directors‟ qualification 
and directors‟ professional affiliation) that are not yet captured by previous studies, 
even though they may influence company performance. The Revised Code of 
Corporate Governance (2007) recommends that directors must have qualities such 
as skills, knowledge, experience, professionalism and integrity in carrying out their 
duties.i Conducting this study, enriches the literature review relating to family 
companies in Malaysia, and creates greater awareness for regulators, academicians, 
investors and the public that family controlled companies and non-family companies 
share slightly different corporate governance practices.  
 
The presentation of this study is as follows. First, the introduction section highlights 
the problem statement and motivation of the study. Then, discussion on corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance will be deliberated in the literature review 
section. The research methodology is then explained. Then the research findings 
and discussion are presented. Finally, the research findings are summarized 
followed by limitations of the study, and recommendations for future study are made. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Performance 
 
Board governance is one of the important controls in managing the firms operations 
(Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). Previous studies by Western researchers 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Miller & Breton-Miller 2006; Villalonga & Amit 2006) and 
local studies (Amran & Ahmad 2009; Samad et al., 2008) found mixed findings on 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Therefore, in this study, 
several elements of internal governance mechanisms, such as board size, board 
independence, board qualification, director‟s professional qualification and 




Size refers to the number of directors who serve on the board. Large boards are 
claimed to be superior to small ones because larger groups have more capabilities 
and resources, and wider external contracting relationships. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) explained that large groups could enhance problem solving 
capabilities, provide more solution strategies and critical judgement to correct for 
errors.  
 
However, firms with small board size have higher stock market value (Yermack 
1996). A small board is more effective than a larger one in making executive 




with outside parties will be limited, thus, small groups face difficulty in finding suitable 
candidates for replacements, especially from outside (Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
Donahue & Harman 2006). In terms of number, seven or eight executives on the 
board are sufficient to ensure board effectiveness.  Too many executives on the 
board could also create more problems (Lipton & Lorsch 1992). Based on the 
arguments, it is posited that: 
 
H1a: Family-controlled firms with smaller board size have higher firm 
performance than family-controlled firms with larger board size. 
H1b: Non-family-controlled firms with larger board size have higher firm 




Corporate governance views that boards must have at least two directors or one 
third of the board must be independent.ii For family companies, they prefer to have 
independent non-executive directors on the board because the independent non-
executive directors provide unbiased views, a fresh and creative perspective and 
bring a new dimension of experience that may not be found among family directors 
(Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Felton & Watson 2002). Newell and Wilson (2002) found 
that half of the board should comprise non-executives, and Abdullah (2001) 
evidenced that Malaysian companies were largely dominated by non-executive 
directors.  
 
In contrast, there are drawbacks to having a high proportion of non-executive 
directors on boards. The arguments are that non-executive directors can create 
stifling strategic actions, excessive monitoring, lack of business knowledge and lack 
of real independence (Baysinger & Butler 1985; Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker 1994). 
In contrast, family executives provide rich firm-specific knowledge and strong 
commitment to the firm compared to non-executive directors (Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis 2003). Research by Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) found no evidence that 
board independence affects firm performance. In addition, Chin, Vos and Casey 
(2004) claimed that the percentage of non-executive directors has little impact on 
overall firm performance. Based on the arguments, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H2a: Family-controlled firms with a lower percentage of independent non-
executive directors have higher firm performance than family-controlled firms 
with a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors. 
H2b: Non-family-controlled firms with a higher percentage of independent non-
executive directors have higher firm performance than non family-controlled 




The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Revised 2007) recommends that 
directors have certain qualities (skills, knowledge, experience, professionalism and 
integrity) in carrying out their duties.iii Directors with higher education are better in 
managing the business operation than less educated counterparts (Sebora & 
Wakefield 1998). Educational background and skills may also influence family firms‟ 






H3a: There is a relationship between family-controlled firms with a higher 
number of educated directors‟ and firm performance than family-controlled 
firms with a lower number of educated directors‟. 
H3b: Non-family controlled firms with a higher number of educated directors‟ 
have higher firm performance than non-family-controlled firms with a lower 
number of educated directors‟. 
 
Director’s Professional Qualification 
 
Directors‟ educational background and competency contribute positively to the 
success of family firms (Johanission & Huse 2000). Nevertheless, companies face a 
challenge in searching for qualified directors to sit on the board (Hartvigsen 2007).  A 
survey by Ernst & Young shows that many firms in Europe and America struggle to 
find qualified directors (The Economist 2006). Raber (2005) claimed that there is no 
shortage in qualified directors, but stringent laws and rules pertaining to directorship 
and litigation by shareholders that make directors to be more careful in accepting 
their job. Nowadays, firms can no longer be satisfied with directors who simply put in 
a token appearance (Berube 2005). Firms seek qualified directors, together with their 
expertise. A report by Christian & Timbers in New York reflects the tough competition 
for recruiting qualified outside directors (Bates 2003). Hence, it is expected that: 
 
H4a: Family-controlled firms with a lower number of professional directors 
have higher firm performance than family-controlled firms with a higher 
number of professional directors. 
H4b: Non-family-controlled firms with a higher number of professional directors 
have higher firm performance than non-family-controlled firms with a lower 




The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2001) states there should be a 
separate power and authority for Chairman and CEO. CEO duality arises when the 
post of CEO and Chairman are managed by one person. Agency theory evidences 
that a separate leadership structure could curb agency problems, and, thus, enhance 
the firm value (Fama & Jensen 1983; Rechner & Dalton 1991; Fosberg & Nelson 
1999). A survey conducted by PriceWaterhouse Coopers (1999) shows that the 
majority of Malaysian listed companies have separate leadership. Local studies also 
evidence that Malaysian firms‟ exercise separate leadership (Abdullah 2001; Ayoib, 
Nor Aziah & Zuaini 2003; Abdul Rahman & Mohd Haniffa 2005).  
 
In contrast, duality leadership is common among family companies (Chen, Cheung, 
Strouraitis & Wong 2005). Family companies feel that the founder-CEOs are more 
concerned about the survival of their firms to protect their legacy for future 
generations. In the US, Moore (2002) found that some firms practise duality 
leadership. They argue that by splitting the role of the Chairman and CEO, the 
CEO‟s freedom of action is reduced (Felton & Watson 2002). Studies also found that 
stewards that hold duality have significantly higher corporate performance because 
the power to determine strategy and responsibility is in the hands of the stewards 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991; Finkelstein & D'Aveni 1994; Chen et al., 2005). Therefore, 





H5a: Family-controlled firms that practise separate leadership have lower firm 
performance than family-controlled firms that practise duality leadership. 
H5b: Non-family controlled firms that practise separate leadership have higher 
firm performance than non-family controlled firms that practise duality 
leadership. 
 




The sampling frame consists of 424 public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia 
(excluding financial companies)iv that represent the total companies in Malaysia for 
the year ended 2003. The period of 2003 to 2007 was selected to examine the 
implementation effect of the revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(2007) on family-controlled and non-family controlled companies. A family-controlled 
company is defined consistently by the Malaysian rules and regulations. A company 
must fulfil three criteria: (1) Founding CEO is the CEO or the successor of the CEO 
is related by blood or marriage, (2) with at least two family members in its 
management, and (3) family directors have equity ownership of a minimum of 20% in 
the company (Amran 2010). Other companies were categorised as non-family 
controlled companies. The data were hand-collected from the companies‟ annual 
reports. In order to ensure the accuracy of the data, the hand-collected data were 
cross-referenced to the KLSE Annual Handbook and Datastream.v   
 
Panel Data Regression 
 
This paper employs the panel data approach as it eliminates unobservable 
heterogeneity that different firms in the sample data could present, less collinearity 
among the variables and a better measurement than pure cross section or pure time 
series data (Gujarati 2003; Baltagi 2001).  
 
The proposed research model includes two new variables – board with degree 
(BDEG) and board with professional qualification (BPRO) – compared to previous 
works done by Anderson & Reeb (2003); Miller & Breton-Miller (2006); Villalonga & 
Amit (2006); Samad et al. (2008); Amran & Ahmad (2009). The model used is as 
follows: 
 
Qit = b0 + b1BSIZEit + b2BINDit + b3BDEGit + b4BPROit + b5LSHIPit + b6DEBTit 
+ b7FAGEit + b8FSIZEit + εit  
                        
Whereby; 
Q = Market value of ordinary shares plus book value of preferred   
                   shares and debt/ book value of total assets. 
BSIZE  = Number of directors on the board. 
BIND  = % of independent non-executive director/total directors. 
BDEG = % of directors‟ with degree/total directors. 
BPRO = % of director with professional qualification/total directors. 
LSHIP = Leadership (separate = 1, duality = 0). 
DEBT  = Book value of long-term debt/total assets. 




FSIZE       = Natural log of the book value of total assets. 




For corporate governance variables Board size (H1a and H1b), Board independence 
(H2a and H2b), Director‟s with degree (H3a and H3b), Professional directors (H4a and 
H4b) and a dummy variable were used to measure Leadership structure (H5a and 
H5b). The control variables in this study were debt, firm age and firm size.  
 




Table 1: Frequency and Per cent for Family-Controlled and Non-Family 
Controlled Companies  
 
   Frequency Per cent 
Family companies (FC) 955 43.08 
Non-family companies (NFC) 1165 56.92 
Total 2120 100.0 
 
 
Based on Table 1, the sample size for family-controlled companies represents 
43.08%, comprising 955 observations (191 companies on Bursa Malaysia). 
Meanwhile, non-family controlled companies amounted to 1,165 observations (233 
companies) with 56.92% of the total sample. From this analysis, it shows that family 
and non-family companies are players on Bursa Malaysia. This finding reveals that 
family companies do contribute significantly to the Malaysian economy, even though 













  Frequency Per cent  Frequency Per cent 
Industrial 
Product 










171 14.8 Properties 125 13.7 
Properties 123 10.6 Trading 
Services 
117 12.3 
Plantation 80 6.9 Construction 95 10.4 
Construction 70 6 Plantation 66 7.2 
Technology 35 3 Technology 20 2.2 
Infrastructure 
Projects 
20 1.7 Hotels 10 1.1 
Hotels 15 1.3 Infrastructure 
Projects 
5 0.5 
Total 1165 100.0  955 100.0 
 
Table 2 summarises the statistics for non-family controlled and family-controlled 
companies in relation to the industries listed on Bursa Malaysia. For non-family 
controlled companies, the highest sector is for industrial product (30.2%), followed by 
trading services (25.5%) and the consumer product (14.8%) sectors. While the 
majority of family-controlled companies sample are highly involved in industrial 
product (32.9%), consumer product (20.3%) and properties (13.7%). Furthermore, 
trading services (11.7%) and construction (10.4%) are in the fourth and fifth place for 
family-controlled companies. In sum, companies in Malaysia are well diversified and 




















Table 3: Transform Variables for Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and 
Maximum  
 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
 
Q 0.79 0.11 0.27 1.00 
BSIZE 
7.87 1.99 3.00 17.00 
BINED 
0.38 0.11 0.00 1.00 
BDEG 
0.73 0.21 0.13 1.00 
BPROF 
0.30 0.17 0.00 1.67 
LSHIP 
0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
DEBT 
0.09 0.13 0.45 0.75 
LNFSIZE 
12.85 1.33 9.13 18.03 
FAGE 
8.96 10.80 0.00 64.00 
* significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), ***significant at 0.01 (2 tailed). 
Q = Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book 
value of total assets, BSIZE = Number of directors on the board, BIND = Percentage of independent 
non-executive directors divided by total directors, BDEG = Percentage of directors‟ with degree and 
above divided by total directors, BPRO = Percentage of independent directors with professional 
qualification divided by total directors, LSHIP = Type of leadership that a firm practices, whether 
separate leadership or duality leadership, DEBT = The book value of long-term debt by total assets, 
LNFSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE = Number of years since incorporated. 
 
From Table 3, the average value for Tobin‟s Q is 0.79 for 424 companies. This 
indicates that the performance value for companies on Bursa Malaysia is considered 
strong. The average number of directors sitting on the board is eight people per 
board. The minimum board size is three members and the maximum number is 17 
members.  Therefore, this finding supports previous studies that recommend seven 
or eight executives on the board to ensure its effectiveness (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; 
Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996).  
 
For board independence, on average, 38% of board composition consists of 
independent directors. This indicates that companies do comply with The Code 
(2001), which suggests that at least one-third of boards must be independent 
directors. The result also shows that 73% of Malaysian directors do have a degree 
qualification. The finding supports The Code (Revised 2007) that encourages 
companies to search for directors who possess qualifications. Furthermore, it is 
hoped that with a higher number of directors with a degree, companies may utilise 
the human resources for the benefit of the company and the nation at large. Nearly 
30% of companies do have professional directors sitting on the board. However, the 
number is still low and the reason for a low percentage of professional directors may 
be due to the difficulty in identifying suitable candidates and because directors are 





The mean for leadership structure is 0.90 and the standard deviation is around 0.3. 
Most Malaysian companies do practise separate leadership compared to duality 
leadership. This practice is in line with The Code (2001). In terms of debt, the usage 
of debt is low and is reported as having a mean of 0.09 and a standard deviation of 
0.13. Companies do not use debt to any great extent and prefer other means to 
finance the business. The mean for firm size is 13, with a minimum of 9 and 
maximum of 18. On average, the majority of Malaysian companies have experience 
of 9 years on the market and there are companies that have survived and continued 
to do business for 64 years. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
The panel Generalized Least Square (GLS) method was used over the five-year 
period (2003-2007). The GLS was adopted because it is a better estimation method 
and effectively standardizes the observations (Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2000).  
 
Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis (dependent variable = Tobin’s Q) 
 
 FCF (a) NFCF (b) 
BSIZE (H1) -0.003*** 
 
-0.001 
BINED (H2) 0.011 -0.017 
BDEG (H3) 0.006 0.057*** 
 
BPROF (H4) -0.004 -0.020 
 


















Overall R2  0.1516 0.2072 
N 233 191 
* significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), ***significant at 0.01 (2 tailed). 
Q = Market value of ordinary shares plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book 
value of total assets, BSIZE = Number of directors on the board, BIND = Percentage of independent 
non-executive directors divided by total directors, BDEG = Percentage of directors with degree and 
above divided by total directors, BPRO = Percentage of independent directors with professional 
qualification divided by total directors, LSHIP = Type of leadership that a firm practices, whether 
separate leadership or duality leadership,  DEBT = The book value of long-term debt by total assets, 
LNFSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE = Number of years since incorporated. 
 
The analysis in Table 4 shows that hypotheses H1a, H3b and H5a are not supported. 
For board size, it is as predicted that family-controlled companies do have a smaller 
board size compared to non-family controlled companies. This finding supports 
previous studies by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) in 




with a degree do significantly impact firm performance for non-family controlled 
companies. This interesting finding indicates that non-family controlled companies do 
choose qualified directors of calibre to sit on the board, as it would enhance firm 
performance. However, family-controlled companies practising a duality leadership 
structure have higher firm performance. Earlier studies also found that stewards who 
hold the position of both Chairman and CEO have higher performance because 
he/she can determine the strategy, focus on the company leadership and protect the 
family legacy for future generations (Donaldson & Davies 1991; Finkelstein & 
D‟Aveni 1994; Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Samad et al., 2008). However, board 
independence (H2a and H2b) and directors with professional qualification (H4a and 
H4b) do not influence company performance. 
 
The control variables, LNFSIZE and FAGE, do affect the firm performance of family-
controlled and non-family controlled companies, and firm size is negatively related 
with performance. Large firms do show lower firm value compared to small firms. 
This may be because companies may not be able to fully control and monitor the 
business as the companies become larger in size. Thus, the performance slowly 
decreases. For firm age, as a firm becomes older on the market, the performance 
declines. This shows that firms cannot sustain too long on the market to meet the 
demand, thus, the firm value decreases. 
 
5. Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This study evidences that family-controlled companies have a smaller board size and 
practise duality leadership in running the family business. Furthermore, for non-
family controlled companies, the qualification of the directors significantly influences 
firm performance. In sum, family-controlled companies do actually use different 
strategies and have a high sense of family ties among their families. Regulators and 
investors need to be sensitive to the fact that the corporate governance practised by 
family-controlled companies differs slightly from that of non-family controlled 
companies. One limitation of this study that future research may consider is looking 




                                                 
i
 Part 2 – Best Practices in Corporate Governance, VIII. 
ii
 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2001, Part 2, AA III). 
iii
 Part 2 – Best Practices in Corporate Governance, VIII). 
iv
 The industry is regulated under the Banking and Financial Act (BAFIA), 1989 (Chu & Cheah, 2004). 
v
 The Datastream database is available in Sultanah Bahiyah Library, Universiti Utara Malaysia. Financial data 
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